

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8 MAR 1950

Mr. Daniel Cox Pahey, Jr.  
National Security Resources Board  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Pahey:

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
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AUTH: HR 10-2  
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In your letter of 3 March, 1950, you request an estimate of the possibility of all-out war between the United States and the USSR before 1957.

In view of the ultimate objective of Soviet policy -- a Communist world order under Soviet domination -- and of the existing international situation, there is a present danger of war which cannot be ignored. In present or comparable circumstances a deliberate, unprovoked Soviet attack on the United States is improbable, as is any Soviet military aggression deemed to incur serious risk of war with the United States. There is, however, a continuing danger of war through miscalculation, nor can the possibility of deliberate attack be prudently excluded for consideration.

The development of this situation is primarily dependent on two factors: (1) the prospective development of Soviet capabilities, with particular reference to a capability of large-scale atomic attack; and (2) concurrent developments with respect to the political and military posture of the United States and its allies.

The first factor is calculable in broad terms. During in the period under consideration the USSR will be capable of delivering a crippling attack on the United States, if its defenses have been neglected or if surprise can be achieved. This qualified capability could not of itself render probable an unprovoked attack. The most ruthless and aggressive dictatorship could wait reasonable certainty, not only of ultimate success, but also of relative impunity, before deliberately initiating atomic warfare. A substantial Soviet atomic capability, however, would increase the possibility of deliberate attack. By encouraging Soviet political aggression, it would also increase the danger of war through miscalculation.

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The second factor is less calculable. The achievement of a strong Western political military posture would tend to deter Soviet aggression, but the certain prospect of that achievement could conceivably provoke a preventive Soviet attack.

In summation:

(1) A deliberate, unprovoked Soviet attack before 1957 cannot be predicted as probable.

(2) There is, however, a continuing danger of war with the USSR.

(3) This danger will probably increase progressively during the period under consideration.

This estimate is based on all intelligence information available to the departments and agencies of the government. For want of time, however, it has not been coordinated with the departmental intelligence agencies. As you know, a relevant formal estimate is now in process of coordination, but is unlikely to become available at an early date.

Sincerely,

Signed - *dis vtr ER 3/8/50.*

D/G1, ORF-LLM/vmc

R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CC- Fahey ✓

DCI

AD/ORE

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Central Records

D/G1

NOTE FOR RECORD: Basic states the Pres had directed that Bureau of Budget & NSRB carefully examine current stockpiling program and its objectives and advise him concerning their adequacy and timeliness from the standpoint of security. An est of the time element inherent in the risk of war must necessarily be one of the basic points considered in providing such a review for the Pres. States he, Daniel Cox Fahey, has been asked by Bureau-NSRB Committee working on this review to ascertain for them CIA's answer to following question: What are the possibilities that the USSR will provoke an all out attack against the U.S. before the end of 1953? Before the end of 1956?

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Correspondence file on  
"Appraisal of Foreign Economic Intelligence  
Requirements, Facilities and Arrangements Related  
to the National Security"

filed "NSC Reports"